The future demand for and potential shortages of food-supply veterinarians have been the subject of much concern. Using the Delphi forecasting method in a three-phase Web-based survey process, a panel of experts identified the trends and issues shaping the demand for and supply of academic food-animal veterinarians, then forecasted the likely future demand and shortages of food-supply veterinarians employed in academic institutions in the United States and Canada through 2016. The results indicate that there will be increasing future demand and persistent shortages of academic food-supply veterinarians unless current trends are countered with targeted, strategic action. The Delphi panel also evaluated the effectiveness of several strategies for reversing current trends and increasing the number of food-supply veterinarians entering into academic careers. Academic food-supply veterinarians are a key link in the system that produces food-supply veterinarians for all sectors (private practice, government service, etc.); shortages in the academic sector will amplify shortages wherever food-supply veterinarians are needed. Even fairly small shortages have significant public-health, food-safety, animal-welfare, and bio-security implications. Recent events demonstrate that in an increasingly interconnected global economic food supply system, national economies and public health are at risk unless an adequate supply of appropriately trained food-supply veterinarians is available to counter a wide variety of threats ranging from animal and zoonotic diseases to bioterrorism.
The recent occurrence in the USA of deliberate release of virulent Bacillus anthracis in letters sent to three media corporations and to the American senate has led to a great anxiety in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe. Numerous letters have been suspected to contain B. anthracis spores and several have contained powder of different types. In none of the tested letters collected by the Swedish police have we been able to detect anthrax bacilli. Powder containing letters have been tested with either bacterial isolation and/or B. anthracis specific PCR. Anthrax is a disease found naturally in herbivores and is occasionally spread to humans. It is caused by the gram-positive rod B. anthracis that was discovered by Robert Koch in 1876. Beginning in the 1930s many states have developed B. anthracis for use as a weapon. A few releases of the bacteria have been reported before October 2001. B. anthracis causes three forms of disease, cutaneous, pulmonary and gastro-intestinal. The pulmonary form is the most dangerous and may lead to death merely one to two days after onset of severe symptoms. This is due to the rapid growth and release of several potent toxins that engage the immune system and promote tissue destruction. B. anthracis infection can be treated with several antibiotics, among which quinolones and tetracyclins have been recommended. Diagnosis can readily be achieved by microscopy, bacterial isolation and PCR at the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control and the Swedish Defence Research Agency. Antibiotics relevant for treatment of B. anthracis infections are already stockpilled in our country. Further actions to strengthen our capability to deal with bioterrorism are ongoing.
Terrorist attacks using an aerosolized pathogen have gained credibility as a national security concern after the anthrax attacks of 2001. Inferring some important details of the attack quickly, for example, the number of people infected, the time of infection, and a representative dose received can be crucial to planning a medical response. We use a Bayesian approach, based on a short time series of diagnosed patients, to estimate a joint probability density for these parameters. We first test the formulation with idealized cases and then apply it to realistic scenarios, including the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979. We also use simulated outbreaks to explore the impact of model error, as when the model used for generating simulated epidemic curves does not match the model subsequently used to characterize the attack. We find that in all cases except for the smallest attacks (fewer than 100 infected people), 3-5 days of data are sufficient to characterize the outbreak to a specificity that is useful for directing an emergency response.
Biological weapons have been known for centuries, and since World War II, offensive programs have accelerated the development of these weapons considerably. The anthrax attacks in the fall 2001 and speculations regarding the research and development of Iraqi bioweapons have been causes for concern. The effect of biological weapons may be overwhelming, in particular when one is dealing with a contagious agent. The National Centre for Biological Defence provides a preparedness capability through evidence-based research and practical operational capabilities.
